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Response to Military Downsizing in the U.S. and the European
Union: A Comparative Analysis 1
The political context for responding to bas~ closing and
defense industry downsizing is profoundly different in the us and
Europe. In the European context, defense conversion comes out of
a context of a wide variety of other regional adjustment
programs.
These are both desired by potential recipient regions
and viewed -·-w·itlr some ··suspicion··by those -~iith administrative
responsibility for such programs.
For affected regions, the
perspective seems to be that if other structural changes in the
European economy have led·to European interventions on behalf of
the regionally affected areas, then defense conversion should be
entitled to similar consideration.
Almost by definition; most structural_ changes have affected
less well off parts of Europe.
Declining industries and
declining areas are traditionally correlated.
Defense
downsizing, however, often affects regions~which have been
outside eligibility for traditional area-based assistance
programs.
In part this is true precisely because they nave been
defense dependent, and defense has been a relatively healthy part
of European economies.
(This has.been reinforced for those areas
which have been defense dependent because of the presence of
large American facilities -- the -drivers for this aspect of
regional economies has obviously been American defense policy,
not the economics of the countries within which they are
located.)
Defense dependent regions have also, in their manufacturing
guise, been typically high-tech economies.
Regions such as this
are also typically the types which are ineligible for regionally
based assistance to areas of decline.
Defense conversion, therefore, not only makes these regions
newly vulnerable, it also, in many cases for the first time, puts
them into a ci~cumstance where they might be eligible for
European Union regional fund assistance.
Some of the material for the American portion of this analysis
was gathered while the author served as a National Association of
Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) Fellow with
the Office of Economic Adjustment, Department of Defense.
The
views expressed are solely those of the author.
Support for the European portion of this research was provided by
the University of Missouri-St. Louis Center for International
Studies; Department of Political science; and Public Policy
Administration Program.
Their assistance is gratefully
acknowledged.

1

Thts poses two countervailing pressures for European
administrators and politicians.
On the one hand, it raises
issues of defense policy which have typically laid outside the
bo.unds of European Union policy. Whether defense policy should
be moved INSIDE the bounds of European Union policy is a highly
controversial issue.
Defens~ conversion, seen under this
heading, is a problematic topic, and one best avoided.
on the other hand, defense conversion has clear impacts on
regiona.l economies, and this is precisely the type of issue· area
in which th~-European·union·bas·been-tradit~onally involved.
Indeed, the EU's involvement in such matters can be said to
predate the Treaty of Rome itself, since the European Coal and
Steel Community, its predecessor institution, has long been
involved in assistance programs for declining regions of coal and
steel production.
For elected European officials, particularly for the
European Parliament, defense conversion becomes an opportunity
for the extension of Community benefits to areas which have not
previously benefited from it, and allows elected officials who
represent such areas to make claims on the Community on behalf of
their constituencies.
For some MEP's this issue will mark the
first time they have been able to do so.
Because defense conversion is a new issue, there are no preexisting local or national resource allocations going to it.
Community assistance, therefore, can be seen as providing
authentically new and additional resources, and not just
substituting for previously provided local resources.
The end of the Cold War has lead to defense downsizing in US
and Western Europe~
With defense downsizing comes issues of
economic adjustment for communities which had been especially
impacted by dependence on military expenditures.
These common problems are responded to in many different
political contexts: an EU still in process of establishing and
defining the scope of its authority; a US where the extent of the·
appropriate federal role is the subject of contentious political
debate, but the fact of nation-state status goes essentiilly
unquestioned.
In the American context, the Federal government is the preeminent, almost sole player in defense/national security issues,
in Europe the role of European institutions in defense policy is
really only.just beginning. There is no EU Defense Department,
this is a national responsibility.

Defense conversion, in its DEFENSE aspect, therefore, is a
problematic issue for the EU (as to whether this is within its
appropriate jurisdictional range), but unquestioned in the US.
2

Defense conversion, in its REGIONAL ASSISTANCE aspect,
however, is a by-now traditional activity of the EU, but is more
probiematic in the us, where there are continuing debates about
its legitimacy as a Federal function.
How then, do these twin juxtapositions work themselves out
in practice?

·· ·I.·· Cultural - and·-··Po'li ti cal ·Assumptions
Although there has been considerable political debate in the
United states regarding the severity of the impact of defense
downsizing, the view that the process is a manageable one is
widespread.
At the time the current American base closing
process was put into place, by far the most widely quoted study
of earlier base closings found that after a period of time there
were more jobs on former military bases than there had been
civilian jobs before base closing.
(Glassberg, 1995a).
Because civilian jobs had a much greater multiplier effect
on the local economy, their replacement was much more important
than loss of·uniformed military jobs in a community. While this
study did not address the impact of significant cuts in defense
industries, it nevertheless set the tone for much of subsequent
American policymaking.
Defense ·downsizing posed problems, but
not insurmountable ones.
In the European context, different assumptions were made.
In one particularly evocative· passage, a European analyst
described communities which had lost military bases as places
where "villages which were living places yesterday are today
empty of population and bring to mind nothing so much as the
ghost towns of the American west after the gold rush."
( Sudar skis, 1994)
Implicit in such perspectives is the
expectation that defense conversion activities at the community
level will need to be projects of long duration, and even then
ones with no certainty of success.
·
This interpretation was confirmed by an individual heavily
involved in American defense conversion assistance projects who
was detailed to work with European projects.
This observer
reported that in joint meetings American participants were far
more likely to see defense conversion community assistance as
something that had a clear end-point to •it.
A sense of closed military bases, in particular, as having
ghost-town potential is reinforced, particularly in Germany (and
to some extent in Britain as well) by the fact that most, if not
all of the.closing facilities are foreign ones.
For Germany,
this has been most pronounced with regard to former Soviet bases,
but must surely color perceptions for former Western bases as
well.
(In the U.S., closing bases are often located in
3

communities which have a strong military flavor outside the
bases, in the presence of significant nu-mbers of military
retirees.
Closing foreign bases in European countries have no
such context.
The very idea of war is, on balance, differently perceived.
Although fifty years have passed since a general European
conflagration, memories remain strong. War is something that can
happen HERE.
This is very unlike many American views (usually
only implicit) that war is something that takes place overseas.
· rn··the· ·Europ·ean···context ,' •·att"i tudes about' ·European Union
defense conversion programs need to be seen in terms of more
general attitudes towards "Europe." This is particularly true at
the governmental level. Thus, wariness about Europe in British
governments provides a setting for some wariness about defense
conversion -- above and beyond what the issue itself might
generate.
In the United States, the very wide ranging disputes about
the appropriate scope of federal government activities do not
reach the core of defense conversion assistance.
Grants to
communities with base closings, for example, have expanded very
considerably and have not been the subject of significant
partisan conflict.
The federal nature of the United states and the emerging
quasi-federal nature of th~ European Union both raise
difficulties in determining how directly to deal with su_bnational entities.
For both the European Union and the United
States, defining which body appropriately represents "local"
interests during a base closing has been problematic~
The
variegated structure of American local governments makes such
determination difficult here (Glassberg, 1995b).
Although the European Union has created an administrative
structure for classifying local governments within its
territories (the NUTS system), this doesn't necessarily provide
much assistance in developing decision-making criteria as to
which NUTS level should receive defense conversion assistance,
and whether such determinations need to be uniform, either across
the community as a whole or even within individual member
nations.
The vastly weaker authority of the European Union leaves
open questions regarding how forcefully the EU can (or should)
decide on and enforce community-wide decisions on how to spend
available defense conversion funds. While matters of this kind
are not unknown in the U.S., in the defense conversion field it
is widely accepted that the federal government, as both the
responsible level for defense policy and the provider of the bulk
of the funds for defense conversion assistance, is the
appropriate authoritative decision-maker regarding funds
disbursement.
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The centrality of the "regional assistance" mode of thinking
about defense conversion programs in Europe raises some questions
which are different from those that arise in the U.S., where
defense conversion (especially for closing military base
communities) is usually seen as a narrower issue.
For Europe,
for EU parliamentarians, and for EU administrative decision
makers, the regional assistance aspect of defense conversion
contains paradoxical elements.
In both Europe and in the United States, regions with heavy
military presence have tended to be relatively more affluent
places. ···-In--part ··this ·is ··undoubtedly ·due to·· def·ense investment in
the areas.
Since the basic purpose of European regional
assistance programs is to reduce inter-regional disparities, i t
seems counter to such purposes to provide any significant amount
of financial assistance to relatively more affluent communities,
even when such communities have been adversely affected by a
significant economic change (such as defense cutbacks.)
This helps to explain some of the reluctance of EU
administrators to push forcefully for defense conversion as an
aspect of EU regional policy, and why much of the impetus for the
development of such activities came from EU parliamentarians
(especially from Germany) who realized that their country
received very ~little in EU regional assistance spending and
argued, successfully, that the severity and suddenness of defense
cuts justified EU support, even though the areas they represented
were clearly above-average in affluence.
In the U.S., with much less of .an explicit tradition of
regional assistance to reduce disparities, such arguments were
muted.
While some scholars ·argued that communities that had
thrived with heavy military presence were not now entitled to any
special assistance as such presence waned (Weidenbaum, 1992),
this position has not carried the day.
In the u.s., community planning assistance continues to be
provided through a Defense Department agency, in the European
Union the delivery body is DGXVI, the Directorate for Regional
Affairs.
Because of this location, KONVER, the EU defense
conversion assistance grant program, gets evaluated in the
context of other feelings about EU regional policy.
Although, as indicated above, the basis for such a policy is
a commitment to reduce regional disparities, other issues are on
the table as well. The Common Agricultural Policy, widely
perceived as a pro-rural-France regional policy, is always near
to the surface of more general debates about regional assistance.
In a somewhat different vein, observers report widespread sense
in northern Europe that much assistance to. southern European
communities is not effectively spent.
The euphemistic shorthand
for this in EU documents is the need for "reform of the
structural funds."
While defense conversion activities do not have anything
5

directly to do·with either the common agricultural policy or
concerns about effective spending of other regional funds, the
existence of these other disputes forms part of the context in
which KONVER activ-i ties take place.

II.

Institutional structures

European Union defense adjustment programs are administered,
at the Union leve.l, by DG XVI, the Directorate with
responsibility ··-for ··regional···policy .·" Since the EU lacks any
specific defense responsibility, alternate locations for policy
initiatives in this area were really not available. This focus is
mirrored at the national level, where d~fense conversion
activities are also located in economic development, rather ·than
in defense ministries. In Britain, as an example, national-level
policy is in the hands of the Department of Trade and Industry.
In its first Common Market formulation, support for defense
conversion was contained within the PERIFRA initiative, which was
originally designed to provide assistance to (geographically)
peripheral areas of the Common Market territory.
It had no
specific linkage to either defense policy or to defense
conversion.
(Even earlier, a set of defense-dependent
communities received a European Union grant under a program
designed to promote gr~ater cooperation among localities in
different countries.
This first grant led to the "Network
Demilitarised" among a set of sixteen communities.)
European initiatives .in this sphere did not begin until
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the "end of the Cold War."
This is in contrast to the United States, where adjustment
efforts preceded the end of the Cold War, and were supported by
defense hawks who wantedthe·military to have more opportunity
for restructuring its own budgets (and not to be bound to bases
it no longer wanted.)
[See Glassberg, 1995a] Although there
have been some efforts to shi-ft administrative responsibility to
the Department of Cbmmerce or the White House, economic
adjustment planning support remains within the American Defense
Department.
In the European context, defense conversion is playing
itself out in other, Europe-wide institutional contexts. The
Maastricht Treaty enhanced the role of the European Parliament,
and parliamentarians have used defense conversion as an arena for
greater assertions of their authority. KONVER, the successor
program to PERIFRA, is explicitly focused on defense conversion
and is a product of pressure from and decisions taken by the
European Parliament.
This becomes an occasion, therefore, for
the Parliament to demonstrate its new powers as a policy
initiator.
At the same time, resistance to growth of EU authority
remains strong.
This too can be seen in defense conversion
6

activities .. While defense conversion funding was small,
experimental, and clearly temporary, as was .the case with
PERIFRA, it was possible to organize programs to be direct EU to
local area grants.
As KONVER became larger, more
institutionalized, and more politically visible, the-nation-state
members of the Union reasserted a role and KONVER grants flow
from the Union to the national level, and only through national
institutions down to the community level.
·
While DG XVI has an interest in promoting a "Europe of the
Regions," national governments are more resistant to the concept.
How -directly --sub--national---·governments· ·ou·ght ·to - be able to deal
with Brussels remains a matter in ~onsiderable political
contention. In the specialized language of the EU, this is the
issue of "subsidiarity," -- what level is appropriate for what
types of service delivery responsibilities.
In the United States, by contrast, debates about federalism
have not typically involved defense conversion questions.
While
grants from the Defense Department do go directly to communities
affected, the relevant federal decision-makers tend to defer to
state organizational decisions, when state governments choose to
assert them~
(Glassberg, 1995b)
One worldwide problem· in grants administration, present in
both European and American defense conversion activities, are
efforts of the higher levels to ensure that the funds they
provide are not simply substituted for locally-generated
resources that sub-national entities would be spending in any
event. American federal grant legislation routinely provides
"maintenance of effort" requirements, but how much- impact such
provisions actually have on local fiscal allocations remains in
much debate.
Perhaps because of its institutional location within
"Regional Development," this appears to be a larger issue for
European defense conversion than has been true in the United
States.
Again in EU language, this is the issue of
11
additionality, 11 -...! to what extent EU funds are simply being
substituted for local resources. As will be seen below, the EU's
ability to monitor its requirements for 11 additionality" are only
weakly developed.
In the U.S., maintenance of effort questions arise much less
frequently for defense conversion, although they are a regular
part of the debate on many other types of federal activities.
Because defense conversion continues to be seen in a separate,
specialized context (both administratively and politically), the
battles of other issue domains do not spill over as
"automatically" as they do in Europe.
Base closings, for example, trigger relatively automatic
grants from the federal government to affected communities, as do
significant cutbacks in defense industry activity. Eligibility
is driven by formula, but effectively all base closings of any
7

significant size qualify, as do cutbacks in any of the major
defense industry centers in the U.S.
Questions about how
communities might respond without f.ederal aid are sometimes
raised by external _observe~s, but are not prominent within
standard political debate.
Normal feqeral grant regulations ar~
put in place, but controversy about providing such assistance is
surprisingly light.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference_ in institutional
context between American and European defense conversion
activities··-·is ·the ·longevity ·and· perceived stability of the
institutional structures themselves.
In Europe, the very
structures which mu~t formulate defense conversion policy are
themselves new, controversial, and without long experience. In
the United States, even the Defense Department entity which
administers planning assistance has an over-thirty-year history.
The fundamental arrangements of the American structure appear
ancient compared to the newly-emerging structures of "Europe."
Even the geographical bounds of the entities they serve are
far more fixed in the United States than in Europe.
This is not
just a theoretical point.
One of the first difficulties which
arose in European conversion activities was the eligibility of
affected areas in the former ·East Germany, the "neue Laender. 11
While such areas were originally excluded from PERIFRA grants,
they are now eligible under KONVER funding, although with
ceilings on how much of available funds will be spent in this
area.
This point is not limited to European Union-level
institutions.
As Europe evolves, national and sub-national
structures also continue to evolve.
In Britain, for example,
much of the work and some of the authority for allocational
decisions has been handed over to new regional administrative
structures, the "Regional Offices," which have cross-ministerial
responsibilities.
While local-level defense conversion administrators now
routinely speak ab6ut their dealings with ''Government Office
Southwest," or "Government Office Northwest," these entities have
been formed in a way essentially invisible to the general public.
(An electronic search of British media sources found only the
barest mention of these institutions since their creation in
April, 1994.
One must turn to Government and Opposition press
releases which apparently have never made it to the commercial
media for accounts of these new structures.) (Moncrieff, 1993),
(Department of the Environment, 1995). Defense conversion is
only one of many foci for these new offices, but the fragility of
their existence raises doubts as to how authoritative they can be
in case of allocational controversies.
German defense conversion has not, as of.yet, created any
new structures within the German federal system, but division of
powers being the ~ederal Government and the Laender remains
8

uncertain, particularly in the ca_se of the eastern states which
still receive heavy federal subsidies.

III.

Nature of the defense conversion problem

In the United States, base closings have an elaborate
structure for decision-making. European closing procedures are
very much simpler, and base closing can, therefore, more suddenly
impact on a community. The very different nature of domestic and
foreign·· bases;·· and ·the-·diff erential· ··impact --of-- foreign bases from
different nations, affects the impact of the closing on the
relevant community.
Although American forces engage in negotiation about the
terms of base closing with the German an~ British governments,
there is nothing like the BRAC process required. Consequently,
it has been possible to close a larger fraction of U.S. bases in
Europe than in America itself. All former Soviet bases, have now
been closed in eastern Germany.
For the UK, closing military bases, both British and
American, are nominally British military bases.
Therefore,
closed American bases revert to the MOD when the us forces leave.
The~ close, therefore, on MOD terms.
The MOD is under
instructions to maximize the financial return from closed
facilities.
This is the subject of controversy.
A House of Commons
committee complained that the Government and the MOD felt the
need for more money from sales to meet current British military
expenses
"There is no mistaking the sense of frustration which
members and officers of many local authorities feel in their
dealings with Moo on estate matters, in particular but not
exclusively on disposals.
They evidently find the
uncertainty as to the ultimate locus of decision-making
particularly difficult, so that often fruitful working
relationships with the local Defence Lands agent are.wasted.
The complicated dance between the Defence Lands Service and
the "users" - the individual Services - is compounded by an
apparent policy vacuum at Moo itself, so that many
authorities find it difficult to discover if land is to be
released or not, and receive contradictory answers."
(Defence Committee, First Report, 1994, p. xvi)
The Committee, continuing its argument that
insufficient planning for disposal, suggested that:

there was

"obtaining the highest cash price is the driving force in
disposals, neglecting wider conceptions of public interest
and environmental benefit."
(Defence Committee, First Report, 1994, p. xviii)
9

The Government responded that:
"The Government acknowledges the committee's views that a
simple search for capital.receipts does not in every case
secure for the community the best long term return, however
expressed. The· MoD takes a strategic look at sites and how
its requirement to maximize receipts can be reconciled with
local aspirations.
However, the MoD is not funded to aid
economic regeneration." (Defence Committee, Second Report,
1995, p. vi)
This-··pattern··contrasts ·with·'the--situation iri Germany and in
the United States. In the U.S., an early expectation that base
closings could be used as a significant source of capital for the
Defense Department has given way to an emphasis on promoting
economic development (especially jobs) in areas where there are
military cutbacks.
In Germany, base closing means the closing of bases occupied
by foreign military forces, largely American and British in
western Germany, and Soviet in eastern Germany.
Since these
bases were not in any way a part of the German military
establishment, when closed they do not revert to the Bundeswehr,
as American bases in Britain revert to the Ministry of Defence.
Instead, closed bases in Germany come under the control of the
Lander, which view them with their own economies in mind.
Although the origins are different, this places the emphasis in
German base closing somewhat closer to the American than to the
British model.
Industrial downsizing takes on different guises in different
European countries, depending on the ownership structure of the
enterprises involved.
British and German industrial responses
are best seen in the context of overall national industrial
policies (and extent of state ownership.)
The Conservative
government in Britain has not been particularly interested in
government-supported diversification (Almquist, 1993: 8).
German governments, both federal and Land, have been
significantly more involved in diversification activities. One
distinctive feature of the German defense industry structure is
the extent of state government partial ownership of defense
industries, particularly under circumstances of downsizing.
(Almquist, 1993:30). These state governments have been active in
seeking conversion/diversification opportunities for the
industries they now partially own.
One rather contentious issue in defense industry adjustment
to downsizing has been the differences between defense industry
expectations, on the one hand, and European Union expectations,
on the other.
The Director of EU defense conversion efforts
commented that:
"The defense ·industry thought that KONVER was for them.
It
was hard for them to understand that we are interested in
regional development [The mission of DGXVI].
Companies
10

wanted to know, 'what are you going to do for us.' ,I said,
•sorry, I'm interested in economic regeneration -- spin
offs, tech transfer, alternative job opportunities, aid to
small and medium sized enterprises."
(Interview with M.
Eric Dufeil, DGXVI, May 31, 1995)
The American adjustment policy structure splits these issues
apart. Within the explicit context of "economic adjustment," the
domain of the Offiqe pf Economic Adjustment of the Department of
Defense,
defense industry programs are clearly focused on
assistance to laid-off employees and to subcontractors of the
major-defense --industry-producers.· ----rf-·la:tger'•firms are involved
at all, it is as assistors in providing for smoother transitions,
rather than the objects or beneficiaries of the program.
Large firms have, however, other vehicles to pursue.
Initiatives such as the Technology Reinvestment Program have as
an explicit goal the building of links between different firms
and the development of "dual-use" technologies.
These are
intended, from the Defense Department point of view, to enhance
the supply capabilities (to the Defense Department} of American
industry, and to bring down military acquisition costs by making
more products available through "civilian specifications" rather
than
narrowly "military specifications."
This program is controversial within the United states, and
has no particular European Union-level counterpart.
(Some member
states may, of _course, be -pursuing -their , own such national-level
initiatives.}
According to the head of the EU KONVER program,
the development -0f such an initiative at the EU level was
considered, but rejected, by a majority of the European
Commission.
Dual-use, as a policy goal, was also rejected for
defense conversion efforts.
IV.

Evaluation

To date, there has been relatively little evaluation of the
impact of European defense conversion efforts.
Although the
"reform of the structural funds" by the European Union in the
early 1990 1 s emphasized the need for evaluation, this is
interpreted, in the defense conversion context, as a requirement
for after-the-fact activity. PERIFRA projects, now having come
to a close, are now seen as appropriate for evaluation. KONVER, a
work in progress, should also be evaluated, but only at a more
mature stage.
As with other aspects of the as-yet weakly-developed
institutions of the European Union, monitoring committees for
ongoing grants should exist at the regional level, with their
setup left to member states.
"What is the value added of the community [EU] program?
This is still disputed.
Some say we could do it at the
national level."
11

But the fundamental benefit of defense conversion, Europestyle, is as an institution building mechanism.
"We link, through the community, regions with ~imilar
projects.
If we are doing well, we .should b~ able to
transfer best practices. •i
Among the most crucial "best practices" to transfer becomes
the very act of sub-national regions from different parts of
Europe working together.
In this context, defense conversion
activities· -become··-one -additional ·smal·l · part of European Union
efforts to reinforce its "emotional" existence BELOW the member
state level, by getting a whole additional set of actors to
identify with the EU and its activities. Such activities are not
without controversy~ being criticized by some as ''Euro-chic"
(John, 1995) and praised by others as European "economic
citizenship (Grahl and Teague, 1994).
However interp~eted, European defense conversion continues
as it began, ari activity focused not just on defense conversion
but also on network-bui_lding among communities with perceived
common problems, but located throughout the different member
states of the EU.

12

References
Almquist, Peter.
Foreign Conversion: supporting material for
Adjusting to the Drawdown: report of the Defense Conversion
Commission. Washington: Department of Defense, 1993)
Defence Committee, House of Commons.
"First Report: The Defence
Estate" (London: HMSO, 30 November, 1994)
Defence Committee, House of Commons.
"Fourth Special Report:
Government Reply to the First Report from the Defence Committee
Session·--1994--95 11 ··· (London: ·-HMSO, -15 ·March, 1995.)
Department of the Environment.
"New London Regional Office A
Success," Press Release 387, 31 July 1995.
Glassberg, Andrew.
"Military Base Closing: How the Process Has
Changed," Business and the Contemporary World, v. 7, no. 1,
(1995) 96-106
Glassberg, Andrew.
"Intergovernmental Relations and Base
Closing," Publius, (forthcoming, 1995)
Grahl, John and Teague, Paul. "Economic Citizenship in the New
Europe," Political Quarterly (1994) v. 65, pp. 379-395
John,
Peter,
"UK Sub-National Offices in Brussels:
Diversification or Regionalization?". Regional Studies, (1995)
vol. 28, 7 pp. 739-759.
Moncrieff, .Chris, "Labour Protest over ·Regional •commissars'",
Press Association Newsfile, October 14, 1993.
Sudarskis, Michel. "La reconversion des installations militaires:
une mutation structurelle," in Michel Sudarskis (ed.) Redevelopment o.f closed military facilities.
(The Hague: INTA
Press, September, 1994), Section 1.
Weidenbaum, Murray.
Small Wars, Big Defense (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992)

13

Occasional Paper No. 9505
August, 1995

Occasional Papers
The Center for International Studies
of the University of Missouri-St. Loui.$. :; ~
issues Occasional Papers at irregular - ,.
intervals from ongoing research projects,
thereby providing a viable means for
communicating tentative results, Comments
on these papers, \herefore, are particularly
welcome. Occasional Papers should not be
reproduced or quoted at length without the
consent of the author or of the Center for
International Studies.

Response to Military Downsizing in
the U.S. and the European Union:
A Comparative Analysis

Andrew Glassberg

Response to Military Downsizing in the U.S.

and the European

Union: A Comparative Analysis 1
The political context for responding to base closing and
defense industry downsizing is profoundly different in the US and
Europe. In the European context, defense conversion comes out of
a context of a wide variety of other regional adjustment
programs. These are both desired by potential recipient regions
and viewed with some suspicion by those with administrative
responsibility for such programs.
Fbr af~ected regions, the
perspective seems to be that if other structural- changes in the
European economy have led to European interventions on behalf of
the regionally affected areas, then defense conversion shou'J::.q: be
entitled to similar consideration.
· ·
Almost by definition, most. structural changes have affected
less well off parts of Europe.
Declini~g industries and
declining areas are traditionally correlated.
Defense
downsizing, however, often affects regions· which have been
outside eligibility for traditional area-based assistance
programs.
In part this is true precisely because they have been
defense dependent, and defense has been a relatively healthy part
of European economies.
(This has been reinforced for those areas
which have been defense dependent because of the presence of
large American facilities -- the drivers for this aspect of
regional economies has obviously been American defense policy,
not the economics of the countries within which they are
located.)
Defense dependent regions have also, in their manufacturing
guise, been typically high-tech economies.
Regions such as this
are also typically the types which are ineligible for regionally
based assistance to areas df decline.
Defense conversion, theref.ore·, not only makes these.• regions
newly vulnerable, it also, in many cases for the first time, puts
them into a circumstance where they might be eligible for
European Union regional fund assistance.
Some of the material for the American portion of this analysis
was gathered while the author served as a National. Association of
Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) Fellow with
the Office of Economic Adjustment, Department of Defense.
The
views expressed are solely those of the author.
Support for the European portion of this research was provided by
the University of Missour~-st. Louis Center for International
Studies; Department of Political Science; and Public Policy
Administration Program.
Their assistance is gratefully
acknowledged.
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This poses two counterva•iling pressures for European
administrators and politicians.
On the one hand, i t raises
issues of defense policy which have typically laid outside the
bounds of European Union policy. Whether defense policy should
be moved INSIDE the. bounds of European Union policy is a highly
controversial issue.
Defense conversion, seen under this
heading, is a problematic topic, and one best avoided.
On the other hand, defense conversion has clear impacts on
regional. economies, and this is precisely the type of. issue area
in which the European Union has been traditionally involved.
Indeed, the EU's involvement in such. matters can be said to
predate the Treaty of Rome itself, since the European Coal and
Steel Community, its predecessor institution, has long peen
involved in assistance programs for declining regions of co.a-_:t;:and
steel production.
·
For elected European officials, particularly for the
European Parliament, defense conversion becomes an opportunity
for the extension of Community benefits to ~reas which have not
previously benefited from it, and allows elected officials who
represent such areas to make claims on the Community on behalf of
their constituencies.
For some MEP's this issue will mark the
first time they have been able to do so.
Because defense conversion is a new issue, there are no preexisting local or national resource allocations going to it.
Community assistance, therefore, can be seen as providing
authentically new and additional resources, and not just
substituting for previously provided local resources.
The end of the Cold War has lead to defense downsizing in US
and Western Europe.
With defense downsizing comes issues of
economic adjustment for communities which had been especially
impacted by dependence on military expenditures.
These common problems are responded to in many different
political contexts: an EU still in process of establishing and
defining the scope of its authority; a US where the extent of the
appropriate federal role is the subject of contentious political
debate, but the fact of nation-state status goes essentially
unquestioned.
In the American context, the Federal government is the preeminent, almost sole player in defense/national security issues,
in Europe the role of European institutions in defense policy is
really only just beginning. There is no EU Defense Department,
this is a national responsibility.

Defense conversion, in its DEFENSE aspect, therefore, is a
problematic issue for the EU (as to whether this is within its
appropriate. jurisdictional range), but unquestioned in the US.
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Defense conversion, in its REGIONAL ASSISTANCR aspect,
however, is a by-now traditional activity of the EU, but is more
problematic in the US, where there are continuing debates about
its legitimacy as a Federal. function.
How then, do these twin juxtapositions work themselves· out
in practice?

r.

Cultural and Political Assumptions

'
Although there has been considerable political
debate in the
United States regarding the severity of the impact of defense
downsizing, the view that the process is a manageable oifg; is
widespread.
At the time· the current American basa cloiing
process was put into place, by far the most widely quoted study
of earlier base closings found that after a period of time there
were more jobs on former military bases than there had been
civilian jobs before base closing.
(Glassbe:qg, 1995a).

Because civilian jobs had a much greater multiplier effect
on the local economy, their replacement was much more important
than loss of uniformed military jobs in a community. While this
study did not address the impact of significant cuts in defense
industries, it nevertheless set the tone for much of subsequent
American policymaking. - Defense downsiz·ing posed prob'lems, but
not insurmountable ones.
In the European context, different assumptions were made.
In one particularly evocative passage, a European analyst
described communities which had lost military bases as places
where "villages which were living places yesterday are today
empty of population and bring to mind nothing so much as the
ghost towns of the American ~est after the gold rush."
(Sudarskis, 1994)
Implicit in such perspectives is the
expectation that defense conversion activities at the community
level will need to be projects of long duration, and even then
ones with no certainty of success.
This interpretation was confirmed by an individual heavily
involved in American defense conversion assistance projects who
was detailed to work with European projects.
This observer
reported that in joint meetings American participants were far
more likely to see defense conversion community assistance as
something that had a clear end-point to it.
A sense of closed military bases, in particular, as having
ghost-town potential is reinforced, particularly in Germany (and
to some extent in Britain as well) by the fact that most, if not
all of the closing facilities are foreign ones.
For Germany,
this has been most pronounced with regard to former Soviet bases,
but must surely color perceptions for former Western bases as
well.
(In the U.S., closing bases are often located in
3

communities which have a strong military- flavor outside the
bases,· in the presence_ of. significant numbers of military
retire·es.
Closing foreign bases in European countries have no
such context.
·
The very idea of war is, on balance, differently perceived.
Although fifty years have passed s~nce a general European
conflagration, memories remain strong. War is something that can
happen HERE.
This is very unlike many American views {usually
only implicit) that war is something that takes place overseas.
In the European context, attitudes about European Union
defense conversion programs need to be see;n in terms of more
general attitudes towards "Europe." This is particularly true at
the governmental level. Thus, wariness about Europe in British
governments provides a · setting for some wariness· about de~~:nse
conversion -- above and beyond what. the issue itself might
generate.
In the United States, the very wide ranging disputes about
the appropriate scope of federal government activities do not
reach the core of defens~ conversion assistance.
Grants to
communities with base closings, for example, have expanded very
considerably and have not been the subject of significant
partisan conflict.
The federal nature of the United States and the emerging
quasi-federal nature of the European Union both raise
difficulties in determining how directly to deal with subnational entities.
For both the European Union and the United
States, defining which body appropriately ·represents ''local"
interests during a base closing has been problematic.
The
variegated structure of American local governments makes such
determination difficult here (Glassberg, 1995b).
Although the European Union has created an administrative
structure for classifying local governments within its
territories (the NUTS system), this doesn't necessarily provide
much assistance in developing decision-making criteria as to
which NUTS level should receive defense conversion assistance,
and whether such determinations need to be uniform, either across
the community as a whole or even within individual member
nations.
The vastly weaker authority of the European Union leaves
open questions regarding how forcefully the EU can (or should)
decide on and enforce community-wide decisions on how to spend
available defense conversion funds. While matters of this kind
are not unknown in the U.S., in the defense conversion field it
is widely accepted that the federal government, as both the
responsible level for defense policy and the.provider of the bulk
of the funds for defense conversion assistance, is the
appropriate authoritative decision-maker regarding funds
disbursement.
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-The centrality of· the "regional assistance•i mode· of thinkin,g
about defense conversion programs in Europe raises some questions
which are different fr6m those that arise in ~he U.S., where
defense conversion (especially for closing military base
communities) is usually seen as a .narrower issue.
For Europe,
for EU parliamentarians, and for EU administrative decision
makers, the regional assistance aspect of defense conversion
contains paradoxical elements ..
In both Europe and in the United states, regions with heavy
military presence have tended to be relatively more affluent
places. In part this is undoubtedly due to defense investment in
the areas.
Since the basic purpose of European regional
assistance programs is to reduce inter-regional disparities·, i t
seems counter to such purposes to provide any significant ampunt
of financial assistance to relatively more affluent communi~3ras,
even when such communities have been adversely affected by. a
significant economic change (such as defense cutbacks.)
This. helps t-0 explain some of the reluctance of EU
administrators to push forcefully for defen~e conversion as an
aspect of EU regional policy, and why much of' the impetus for the
development of such activities came from EU parliamentarians
(especially from Germany) who realized that their country
received very little in EU regional assistance spending and
argued, successfully, that the severity and suddenness of defense
cuts justified EU support, even though the areas they represented
were clearly above-average in affluence.
In the U.S., with much less of an explicit tradition of
regional assistance to reduce disparities, such arguments were
muted.
While some scholars argued that communities that had
thrived with heavy military presence were not now entitled to any
special assistance as such presence waned (Weidenbaum, 1992),
this position has not carried the day.
In the U.S., community planning assistance continues to be
provided through a Defense Department agency, in the European
Union the delivery.body is DGXVI, the Directorate for Regional
Affairs.
Because of this location, KONVER, the EU defense
conversion assistance grant program, gets evaluated in the
context of other feelings about EU regional policy.
Although, as indicated above, the basis for such a policy is
a commitment to reduce regional disparities, other issues are on
the table as well. Th& Common Agricultural Policy, widely
perceived as a pro-rural-France regional policy, is always near
to the surface of more general debates about regional assistance.
In a somewhat different vein, observers report widespread sense
in northern Europe that much assistance to southern European
communities is not effectively spent.
The euphemistic shorthand
for this in EU documents is the need for "reform of the
structural funds."
While defense conversion activities do not have anything
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directly to do w-ith either the comnion agricultural policy or
concerns about effective spending of other regional funds,: the
existence of these other disputes forms part of the -context in
which KONVER activities take place.

II.

Institutional structures

European Union defense adjustment programs are administered,
at the Union level, by DG XVI, the Directorate with
responsibility for regional policy.
Since the EU lacks any
specific defense responsibility, alternate locations for policy
initiatives in this area were really not available. This focus is
mirrored at the national level, where defense conver,ion
activities are also located in economic development, rathe~~han
in def_ense ministries. In Britain, as an example, national,;.;.level
policy is in the hands of the Department of Trade and Industry.
In its first Common Market formulation, support for defense
conversion was contained within the PERIFRA initiative, which was
originally designed to provide assistance to {geographically)
peripheral areas of the Common Market territory.
It had no
specific linkage to either defense policy or to defense
conversion.
{Even earlier, a set of defense-dependent
communities received a European Union grant under a program
designed to promote greater cooperation among localities in
different countries.
This first grant led to the "Network
Demilitarised" among a set of sixteen communities.)
European initiatives in this sphere did not begin until
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the "end of the Cold War."
This is in contrast to the United States, where adjustment
efforts preceded the end of the Cold War, and were supported by
,defense hawks who wanted the military to have more opportunity
for restructuring its own budgets (and not to be bound to bases
it no longer wanted.)
[See Glassberg, i995a] Although there
have been some efforts to shift administrative responsibility to
the Department of Commerce or the White House, economic
adjustment planning support remains within the American Defense
Department.
In the European context, defense conversion is playing
itsel~ out in other, Europe-wide institutional contexts. The
Maastricht Treaty enhanced the role of the European Parliament,
and parliamentarians have used defense conversion as an arena for
greater assertions of their authority. KONVER, the successor
program to PERIFRA, is explicitly focused on defense conversion
and is a product of pressure from and decisions taken by the
European Parliament.
This becomes an occasion, therefore, for
the Parliament to demonstrate its new powers as a policy
initiator.
At the same time, resistance to growth of EU authority
remains strong.
This too can be seen in defense conversion
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activities._. While def ens-e conversion funding -was ··small,
experi~ental., and clearly temporary, as was the case with
PERIFRA, i t was possible to organize programs to be direct EU to
local area grants.
As KONVER became larger, more
institutionalized, and more politically visible, the nation-state
members of the Union reasserted a role and KONVER grants fl.ow
from the Union to the national level, and only through national
institutions down to the community level.
While DG XVI has an interest in promoting a "Europe of the
Regions," national governments are more resistant to the concept.
How directly sub-national. governments ought to be able to deal.
with Brussels remains a matter in considerable political.
contention. In the specialized language of 'the EU, this is the
issue of "subsidiarity," -- what level is appropriate for :what
types of service delivery responsibilities.
.... _._i:
In the United States, by contrast, debates. about federalism
have not typically involved defense conversion questions.
While
grants from the Defense Department do go directly to communities
affected, the relevant federal decision-mak~rs tend to defer to
state organizational decisions, when state governments choose to
assert them.
(Glassberg, 1995b)
One worldwide problem in grants administration, present in
both European and American defense conversion activities, are
efforts of the higher levels to ensure that the funds they
provide are not simply substituted for locally-generated
resources that sub-national entities would be spending in any
event.
American federal grant legislation routinely provides
"maintenance of effort" requirements, but how much impact such
provisions actually have on local fiscal allocations remains in
much debate.
Perhaps because of its institutional location within
"Regional Development," this appears to be a larger issue for
European defense conversion than has been true in the United
St ates .
Ag a in in EU 1 an g u age , th i s is the- is sue of
"additionality," -- to what extent EU funds are simply being
substituted for local resources. As will be seen below, the EU's
ability to monitor its requirements for "additionality" are only
weakly developed.
In the U.S., maintenance of effort questions arise much less
frequently for defense conversion, although they are a regular
part of the debate on many other types of federal activities.
Because defense conversion continues to be seen in a separate,
specialized context (both administratively and politically), the
battles of other issue domains do not spill over as
"automatically" as they do in Europe.
Base closings, for example, trigger relatively automatic
grants from the federal government to affected communities, as do
significant cutbacks in defense industry activity. Eligibility
is driven by formula, but effectively all base closings of any
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significant size qual.ify, -as -do -cutbacks- in any of the major defense industry centers in the U.S.
Questions about.how
communities might respond without federal aid. are. sometimes
raised by external observers, but are not prominent within
standard political debate.
Normal federal grant regulations are
put in place, but controversy about providing such assistance is
surprisingly light.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference in institutional
context between American and European defense conversion
activities is the longevity and perceived stability of the
institutional structures themselves.
Iq Europe, the very
?tructures which must formulate defense conversion policy are
themselves new, controversial, and.without long experience._ In
the United States, even the Defense Department entity-Mb;ich
administers planning assistance has an over-thirty-year history.
The fundamental arrangements of the American structure appear
ancient compared to the newly-emerging structures of "Europe."
Even the geographical bounds of the entities they serve are
far more fixed in the United states than in Europe.
This is not
just a theoretical point.
One of the first difficulties which
arose in European conversion activities was the eligibility of
affected areas in the former East Germany, the "neue Laender. 11
While such areas were originally excluded from PERIFRA grants,
they are now eligible under KONVER funding, although with
ceilings on how much of available funds will be spent in this
area.
This point is not limited to European Union-level
institutions.
As Europe evolves, national and sub-national
structures also continue to evolve. In Britain, for example,
much of the work and some of the authority for al.locational
decisions has-been handed over to new regional administrative
structures, the "Regional Offices," which have cross-ministerial
responsibilities.
While local-level defense conversion administrators now
routinely speak about their dealings with "Government Office
Southwest," or "Government Office Northwest," these entities have
been formed in a way essentially invisible to the general public.
(An electronic search of British media sources found only the
barest mention of these institutions since their creation in
April, 1994.
One must turn to Government and Opposition press
releases which apparently have never made it to the commercial
media for accounts of these new structures.) (Moncrieff, 1993),
(Department of the Environment, 1995). Defense conversion is
only one of many foci for these new offices, but the fragility of
their existence raises doubts as to how authoritative they can be
in case of allocational. controversies.
German defense conversion has not, as of yet, created any
new structures within the German federal system, but division of
powers being the Federal Government and the Laender remains
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uncertain,·particularly in the case of the-eastern states which
still receive heavy federal subsidies.

III.

Nature of the defense conversion problem

In the United States, base closings have an elaborate
structure for decision-making. European closing procedures are
very much simpler, and base closing can, therefore, more suddenly
impact on a community. The very different nature of domestic and
foreign bases, and the differential impact of foreign bases from
different nations, affects the impact of the closing on the
relevant community.
'
Although American forces engage in negotiation abo~~:;the
terms of base closing with the German and British governments,
there is nothing like the BRAC process required. Consequently,
it has been possible to close a larger fraction of U.S. bases in
Europe than in America itself. All former Soviet bases, have now
been closed in eastern Germany.
For the UK, closing military bases, both British and
American, are nominally British military bases.
Therefore,
closed American bases revert to the MOD when the US forces leave.
They close, therefore, on MOD terms.
The MOD is under
instructions to maximize the financial return from closed
facilities.
This is the subject of controversy.
A House of Commons
committee complained that the Government and the MOD felt the
need for more money from sales to meet current British military
expenses
"There is no mistaking the sense of frustration which
members and officers of many local authorities feel in their
dealings with MoD on estate matters, in particular but not
exclusively on disposals.
They evidently find the
uncertainty as to the ultimate locus of decision-making
particularly difficult, so that often fruitful working
relationships with the local Defence Lands agent are wasted.
The complicated dance between the Defence Lands Service and
the "users" -·the individual Services - is compounded by an
apparent policy vacuum at MoD itself, so that many
authorities find it difficult to discover if land is to be
released or not, and receive contradictory answers."
(Defence Committee, First Report, 1994, p. xvi)
The Committee, continuing its argument that there was
insufficient planning for disposal, suggested that:
"obtaining the highest cash price is the driving force in
disposals, neglecting wider conceptions of public interest
and environmental benefit."
(Defence Committee, First Report, 1994, p. xviii)
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The Government responded that:"The Government_acknowledges the committee's views that a
simple search for capital receipts does not in every case
secure for the community the best long term return, however
expressed. The MoD takes a strategic look at sites and how
its requirement to maximize receipts can be reconciled with
local aspirations.
However, the MoD is not funded to aid
economic regeneration." (Defence Committee, Second Report,
1995, p. vi)
This pattern contrasts with the situation in Germany and in
the United States.
In the U.S., an early expectation that base
closings could be used as a significant source of capital for the
Defense Department has given way to an emphasis on promoting
economic development (especially jobs) in areas where the~e(;are
military cutbacks.
In Germany, base closing means the closing of bases occupied
by foreign military forces, largely American and British in
western Germany, and Soviet in eastern Ge-1{many.
Since these·
bases were not in any way a part of th~ German military
establishment, when closed they do not revert to the Bundeswehr,
as American bases in Britain revert to the Ministry of Defence.
Instead, closed bases in Germany come under the control of the
Lander, which view them with their own economies in mind.
Although the origins are different, this places the emphasis in
German base closing somewhat closer to the American than to the
British model.
Industrial downsizing takes on different guises in different
European countries, depending on the ownership structure of the
enterprises involved.
British and German industrial responses
are best seen in the context of overall national industrial
policies (and extent of state ownership.)
The Conservative
government in Britairi has not been particularly interested in
government-supported diversification (Almquist, 1993: 8).
German governments, both federal and Land, have been
significantly more involved in diversification activities. One
distinctive feature of the German defense industry structure is
the extent of state government partial ownership of defense
industries, particularly under circumstances of downsizing.
(Almquist, 1993:30). These state governments have been active in
seeking conversion/diversification opportunities for the
industries they now partially own.
One rather contentious issue in defense industry adjustment
to downsizing has been the differences between defense industry
expectations, on the one hand, and European Union expectations,
on the other.
The Director of EU defense conversion efforts
commented that:
"The defense ·industry thought that KONVER was for them.
It
was hard for them to understand that we are interested in
regional development [The mission of DGXVIJ.
Companies
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wanted to know; 'what are you going to do for us.'- I said,
'sorry, I'm interested in economic regeneration -- spin
offs, tech transfer, alternative job opportunities, aid to
small and medium sized enterprises."
(Interview with M.
Eric Dufeil, DGXVI, May 31, 1995)
The American adjustment.policy structure splits these issues
apart. Within the explicit context of "economic adjustment," the
domain of the Office of Economic Adjustment of the Department of
Defense,
defense industry programs are clearly focused on
assistance to laid-off employees and to subcontractors of the
major defense industry producers. If larger firms are involved
at all, it is as assistors in providing for smoother transitions,
rather than the objects or beneficiaries of the program.
Large firms have, however, other vehicles to pu.r§;Ue.
Initiatives such as the Technology Reinvestment Program have- .as
an explicit goal the building of links between different firms
and the development of "dual-use" technologies.
These are
intended, from the Defense Department point of view, to enhance
the supply capabilities (to the Defense Depq..rtment) of American
industry, and to bring down military acquisition costs by making
more products available through "civilian specifications" rather
than
narrowly "military specifications."
This program is controversial within the United States, and
has no particular European Union-level counterpart.
(Some member
states may, of course, be pursuing their own such national-level
initiatives.)
According to the head of the EU KONVER program,
the development of such an initiative at the EU level was
considered, but rejected, by a majority of the European
Commission.
Dual-use, as a policy goal, was also rejected for
defense conversion efforts.
IV.

Evaluation

To date, there has been relatively little evaluation of the
impact of European defense conversion efforts.
Although the
"reform of the structural funds" by the European Union in the
early 1990 1 s emphasized the need for evaluation, this is
interpreted, in the defense conversion context, as a requirement
for after-the-fact activity. PERIFRA projects, now having come
to a close, are now seen as appropriate for evaluation. KONVER, a
work in progress, should also be evaluated, but only at a more
mature stage.
As with other aspects of the as-yet weakly-developed
institutions of the European Union, monitoring committees for
ongoing grants should exist at the regional level, with their
setup left to member states.
"What is the value added of the community [EU] program?
This is still disputed.
Some say we could do it at the
national level."
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But the fundamental benefit of defense conversion, Europestyle, is as an institution building mechanism.
"We link, through the community, regions with similar
projects.
If we are doing well, we should be able to
transfer best practices."
Among the most crucial "best practices" to transfer becomes
the very act of sub-national regions from different parts of
Europe working together.
In this context, defense conversion
activities become one additional small part of European Union
efforts to reinforce its "emotional" existence BELOW the member
state level, by getting a whole additional set of actors to
identify with the EU and its activities. Such activities are.not
without controversy, being criticized by some as "Euro;c:"t;ic"
(John, 1995) and praised by others as European "economic
citizenship (Grahl and Teague, 1994).
However interpreted, European defense conversion continues
as it began, an activity focused not just oq· defense conversion
but also on network-building among communities with perceived
common problems,· but located throughout the different member
states of the EU.
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